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Abstract
We propose an approach for the modular specification and veri-
fication of total correctness properties of object-oriented programs.
We start from an existing program logic for partial correctness based
on separation logic and abstract predicate families. We extend it
with call permissions qualified by an arbitrary ordinal number, and
we define a specification style that properly hides implementation
details, based on the ideas of using methods and bags of methods
as ordinals, and exposing the bag of methods reachable from an ob-
ject as an abstract predicate argument. These enable each method
to abstractly request permission to call all methods reachable by it
any finite number of times, and to delegate similar permissions to
its callees. We illustrate the approach with several examples.
We then extend the approach to a concurrent setting, by incorpo-
rating an existing approach for verifying deadlock-freedom of chan-
nels and locks. Our main contribution here is to achieve information
hiding by using method bags for lock ordering. We also show how
our approach prevents infinite thread creation and enables verifica-
tion of termination of fine-grained concurrent algorithms involving
compare-and-swap loops.
We explain how our approach can be used also to verify liveness
properties of non-terminating programs.
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Abstract. We propose an approach for the modular specification and
verification of total correctness properties of object-oriented programs.
We start from an existing program logic for partial correctness based on
separation logic and abstract predicate families. We extend it with call
permissions qualified by an arbitrary ordinal number, and we define a
specification style that properly hides implementation details, based on
the ideas of using methods and bags of methods as ordinals, and exposing
the bag of methods reachable from an object as an abstract predicate
argument. These enable each method to abstractly request permission
to call all methods reachable by it any finite number of times, and to
delegate similar permissions to its callees. We illustrate the approach
with several examples.
We then extend the approach to a concurrent setting, by incorporating an
existing approach for verifying deadlock-freedom of channels and locks.
Our main contribution here is to achieve information hiding by using
method bags for lock ordering. We also show how our approach prevents
infinite thread creation and enables verification of termination of fine-
grained concurrent algorithms involving compare-and-swap loops.
We explain how our approach can be used also to verify liveness proper-
ties of non-terminating programs.
1 Introduction
We present our approach in the context of a simple Java-like programming lan-
guage.
What should be the contract for interface IntFunc, such that we can prove
total correctness properties of programs involving classes that implement the
interface and classes that call the interface?
interface IntFunc {
int apply(int x);
}
The contract should support programs such as shown in Figure 1.
We are not aware of existing work that answers this question.
class PlusN(int y) implements IntFunc {
int apply(int x)
{ int y := this.y; x + y }
static IntFunc createPlusN(int y)
{ new PlusN(y) }
}
class Twice(IntFunc f)
implements IntFunc {
int apply(int x) {
IntFunc f := this.f;
int y := f.apply(x);
f.apply(y)
}
static IntFunc createTwice(IntFunc f)
{ new Twice(f) }
}
class Program {
static void main() {
IntFunc f1 :=
PlusN.createPlusN(10);
IntFunc f2 :=
Twice.createTwice(f1);
IntFunc f3 :=
Twice.createTwice(f2);
f3.apply(42)
}
}
Fig. 1. A program that implements and calls interface IntFunc
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2, we review the partial cor-
rectness approach that we start from. In Sec. 3, we introduce our approach for
total correctness verification of sequential programs. In Sec. 4, we extend our
approach to multithreaded programs. In Sec. 5, we show how to verify liveness
of non-terminating programs. In Sec. 6, we briefly discuss our implementation.
We discuss related work in Sec. 7 and we conclude in Sec. 8.
2 Separation logic and abstract predicate families
We start from an existing approach for modular specification and verification of
partial correctness properties of object-oriented programs, based on separation
logic [1, 2] and abstract predicate families [3]. A partial correctness specification
for interface IntFunc is:
interface IntFunc {
predicate IntFunc();
int apply(int x);
req this.IntFunc();
ens this.IntFunc();
}
(Notice that we do not attempt to specify full functional correctness.) Interface
IntFunc declares an abstract predicate family IntFunc with no parameters. Classes
that implement the interface will instantiate this predicate family to denote
access permissions for, and invariants over, the memory locations accessed by
method apply. Annotations for the example program are shown in Figure 2.
class PlusN(int y) implements IntFunc {
predicate IntFunc() = this.y 7→ ;
int apply(int x)
req this.IntFunc();
ens this.IntFunc();
{ int y := this.y; x + y }
static IntFunc createPlusN(int y)
req true; ens result.IntFunc();
{ new PlusN(y) }
}
class Program {
static void main()
req true; ens true;
{
IntFunc f1 := PlusN.createPlusN(10);
IntFunc f2 := Twice.createTwice(f1);
IntFunc f3 := Twice.createTwice(f2);
f3.apply(42)
}
}
class Twice(IntFunc f)
implements IntFunc {
predicate IntFunc() =
this.f 7→ f ∗ f.IntFunc();
int apply(int x)
req this.IntFunc();
ens this.IntFunc();
{
IntFunc f := this.f;
int y := f.apply(x);
f.apply(y)
}
static IntFunc createTwice(IntFunc f)
req f.IntFunc();
ens result.IntFunc();
{ new Twice(f) }
}
Fig. 2. Example program annotated with partial correctness specifications
In the remainder of this section, we formally define the program logic that
we start from.
The syntax of the programming language and the annotations is shown in
Figure 3.
We assume a set of interface names ι ∈ ItfNames and a set of class names
C ∈ ClassNames. The types τ of the programming language include at least the
types int of integers and bool of booleans, and the interface types ι and class
types C. Correspondingly, the values v ∈ Values of the programming language
include at least the integers z ∈ Z and the booleans b ∈ B, and the object
references o ∈ ObjRefs. We will assume additional types and values whenever
useful for particular examples.
The expressions include the literal values v, the variable references x, and the
pure operations op(e) that map a sequence of argument values to a result value.
The separation logic assertions P include the boolean expressions e, asserting
that the expression evaluates to true; the points-to assertions e.f 7→ e, asserting
that the indicated field is present in the heap and holds the indicated value; the
separating conjunction P ∗P , asserting that the heap can be split into two parts
such that one conjunct holds in one part, and the other conjunct holds in the
other part; regular conjunction and disjunction; and predicate assertions e.p(e),
asserting that the indicated predicate holds with the indicated argument values.
p ranges over predicate names.
Like expressions, commands c return a value; unlike expressions, they may
also access the heap and have side-effects. The commands include the expres-
sions; a let-like construct τ x := c; c′ that first executes c, binds the result to
variable x of type τ , and then executes c′; conditional commands; parenthesized
commands; static and instance method calls; object creation, field lookup, and
field mutation commands.
A predicate declaration specifies a predicate name and a parameter list; a
predicate definition additionally specifies a body.
An interface method specifies a return type, a method name, a parameter
list, and a contract consisting of a precondition and a postcondition. A class
method additionally specifies a kind (kind instance is the default and is usually
left implicit) and a body.
An interface definition declares a number of predicate families and a number
of interface methods. A class definition declares a list of fields (empty if omitted),
an implemented interface (interface Empty, that declares no predicate families
and no methods, if omitted), a number of predicate family instances, and a
number of class methods.
The type definitions are the interface definitions and the class definitions. A
program is a sequence of type definitions.
τ ::= int | bool | ι | C | · · ·
e ::= v | x | op(e)
P ::= e | e.f 7→ e | P ∗ P | P ∧ P | P ∨ P | e.p(e)
c ::= e | τ x := c; c | if e then c else c | { c }
| C.m(e) | e.m(e) | new C(e) | e.f | e.f := e
pdecl ::= predicate p(τ x);
pdef ::= predicate p(τ x) = P ;
imdef ::= τ m(τ x); req P ; ens P ;
mkind ::= static | instance
cmdef ::= mkind τ m(τ x) req P ; ens P ; { c }
idef ::= interface ι { pdecl imdef }
cdef ::= class C(τ f) implements ι { pdef cmdef }
tdef ::= idef | cdef
program ::= tdef
Fig. 3. Syntax of the programming language and the annotations
We assume a function classOf : ObjRefs → ClassNames such that infinitely
many object references map to any given class. A heap h ∈ Heaps = ObjRefs ×
FieldNames ⇀ Values is a partial function from pairs of object references and
field names to values. We do not allow instantiation of classes that have no fields;
therefore, the set of allocated objects can be derived from dom(h).
We define the semantics of programs by means of a big-step relation (h, c) ⇓ γ
that relates a pre-heap and a closed command (i.e. a command with no free
variables) to an outcome γ, which is either of the form (n, v, h′) where n ∈ N
is the number of execution steps performed, v is the result value, and h′ is
the post-heap, or an exception E, which is either Failure(n), where n ∈ N
is the number of execution steps performed, or Divergence. We define n + γ
as follows: n + (n′, v, h′) = (n + n′, v, h′); n + Failure(n′) = Failure(n + n′);
n + Divergence = Divergence. We define the big-step relation coinductively
[4] by means of the rules shown in Figure 4.
(h, v) ⇓ (1, v, h) (h, c) ⇓ (n, v, h
′) (h′, c′[v/x]) ⇓ γ
(h, τ x := c; c′) ⇓ n+ γ
===================================
(h, c) ⇓ E
(h, τ x := c; c′) ⇓ 1 + E
======================
class C · · · { · · · static τ m(τ x) { c } · · · } (h, c[v/x]) ⇓ γ
(h,C.m(v)) ⇓ 1 + γ
==============================================================
classOf(o) = C
class C · · · { · · · instance τ m(τ x) { c } · · · } (h, c[o, v/this, x]) ⇓ γ
(h, o.m(v)) ⇓ 1 + γ
========================================================================
classOf(o) = C class C(τ f) · · · h′ = h unionmulti {o.f 7→ v}
(h,new C(v)) ⇓ (1, o, h′)
==========================================================
(o, f) ∈ dom(h)
(h, o.f) ⇓ (1, h((o, f)), h)
=======================
(o, f) /∈ dom(h)
(h, o.f) ⇓ Failure(1)
====================
(o, f) ∈ dom(h)
(h, o.f := v) ⇓ (1, v, h[(o, f) := v])
================================
(o, f) /∈ dom(h)
(h, o.f := v) ⇓ Failure(1)
=========================
Fig. 4. Coinductive big-step semantics of the programming language
Note that h unionmulti h′ is undefined if dom(h) ∩ dom(h′) 6= ∅.
We now define the meaning of assertions. To interpret an assertion, we need
an interpretation for the predicates it uses. A predicate interpretation I is a
set I ⊆ ObjRefs × PredNames × Values∗ × Heaps. If (o, p, v, h) ∈ I, this means
that according to interpretation I, predicate assertion o.p(v) is true in heap h.
We now define the truth I, h  P of a closed assertion P under a predicate
interpretation I and a heap h:
I, h  v ⇔ v = true
I, h  o.f 7→ v ⇔ (o, f) 7→ v ∈ h
I, h  P ∗ P ′ ⇔ ∃h1, h2. h = h1 unionmulti h2 ∧ I, h1  P ∧ I, h2  P ′
I, h  P ∧ P ′ ⇔ I, h  P ∧ I, h  P ′
I, h  P ∨ P ′ ⇔ I, h  P ∨ I, h  P ′
I, h  o.p(v) ⇔ (o, p, v, h) ∈ I
We can now define a function F (I) = {(o, p, v, h) | I  (o, p, v, h)} that produces
a predicate interpretation, using I for nested predicate assertions, where
classOf(o) = C class C · · · { · · · predicate p(τ x) = P · · · }
y = FV(P [v/x]) I, h  P [v/x,w/y]
I  (o, p, v, h)
Notice that free variables in a predicate body are implicitly existentially quan-
tified.
It is easy to check that F is monotonic: I ⊆ I ′ ⇒ F (I) ⊆ F (I ′). (This would
not be the case if our assertion language included negation or implication of
assertions.) Therefore, by the Knaster-Tarski theorem, Ifix =
⋂{I | F (I) ⊆ I}
is the least fixpoint of F . We adopt Ifix as the meaning of predicates.
We are now ready to define the meaning of Hoare triples (for partial correct-
ness):
 {P} c {Q} ⇔ ∀h, γ. Ifix, h  P ∧ (h, c) ⇓ γ ⇒ γ  Q
where satisfaction γ  Q of a postcondition by an outcome is defined as:
Divergence  Q
Ifix, h  Q[v/res]
(n, v, h)  Q
The proof rules are shown in Figure 5. Notice that in method contracts, free
variables in the precondition are universally quantified across the contract; their
scope extends to the postcondition as well. Variables that are free only in the
postcondition are existentially quantified in the postcondition.
We consider a class to implement an interface method if the class has a
method of the same name, return type, and parameter list, whose body satisfies
the interface method’s contract. An alternative approach is to check compatibility
of the class method’s contract with the interface method’s contract [5].
The rule of consequence uses validity of implications. We define  P ⇒ P ′
as ∀h. Ifix, h  P ⇒ Ifix, h  P ′. In particular, we have
class C · · · { · · · predicate p(τ x) = P ; · · · }
 classOf(o) = C ∧ o.p(v)⇒ P [o/this, v/x]
 classOf(o) = C ∧ P [o/this, v/x]⇒ o.p(v)
The proof rules are sound: ` {P} c {Q} ⇒  {P} c {Q}. By the following
lemma:
` {true} v {res = v} ` {P} c {Q} ∀v. ` {Q[v/res]} c
′[v/x] {R}
` {P} τ x := c; c′ {R}
class C · · · { · · · static τ m(τ x) req P ; ens Q; · · · }
y = FV(P ) \ x z = FV(Q) \ x, result, y
` {P [v/x,w/y]} C.m(v) {∃w′. Q[v/x,w/y,w′/z, res/result]}
interface ι { · · · τ m(τ x); req P ; ens Q; · · · }
y = FV(P ) \ this, x z = FV(Q) \ this, x, result, y
` {P [o/this, v/x, w/y]} o.m(v) {∃w′. Q[o/this, v/x, w/y,w′/z, res/result]}
class C(τ f) · · ·
{true} new C(v) {(f,v)∈(f,v) res.f 7→ v}
{o.f 7→ v} o.f {o.f 7→ v ∧ res = v}
{o.f 7→ } o.f := v {o.f 7→ v}  P ⇒ P
′ ` {P ′} c {Q′}  Q′ ⇒ Q
` {P} c {Q}
` {P} c {Q}
` {P ∗R} c {Q ∗R}
` {P} c {Q} ` {P ′} c {Q}
` {P ∨ P ′} c {Q}
program = tdef ` tdef ok
` program ok ` idef ok
C ` cmdef ok interface ι { pdecl imdef } ` C implements imdef
` class C(· · ·) implements ι { pdef cmdef } ok
y = FV(P ) \ x z = FV(Q) \ x, result, y
∀v, w. ` {P [v/x,w/y]} c[v/x] {∃w′. Q[v/x, res/result, w/y, w′/z]}
C ` static τ m(τ x) req P ; ens Q; { c } ok
y = FV(P ) \ this, x z = FV(Q) \ this, x, result, y
∀o, v, w. ` {P [o/this, v/x, w/y]} c[o/this, v/x] {∃w′. Q[o/this, v/x, res/result, w/y, w′/z]}
C ` instance τ m(τ x) req P ; ens Q; { c } ok
class C(· · ·) · · · { · · · instance τ m(τ x) req P ′; ens Q′; { c } · · · }
y = FV(P ) \ this, x z = FV(Q) \ this, x, result, y
∀o, v, w. ` {P [o/this, v/x, w/y]} c[o/this, v/x] {∃w′. Q[o/this, v/x, res/result, w/y, w′/z]}
` C implements τ m(τ x); req P ; ens Q;
Fig. 5. Proof rules of the program logic for partial correctness
Lemma 1.
∀n, P, c,Q. ` {P} c {Q} ⇒
∀h, h0, hF , γ. h = h0 unionmulti hF ∧ Ifix, h0  P ∧ (h, c) ⇓ γ ⇒
γ 6= Failure(n)
∧ (∀h′, v. γ = (n, v, h′)⇒ ∃h′0. h′ = h′0 unionmulti hF ∧ Ifix, h′0  Q[v/res])
Proof. By well-founded induction on n. Fix some n0 and assume the lemma
holds for all n < n0. We prove that it holds for n = n0. By nested induction on
the derivation of ` {P} c {Q}. uunionsq
3 Termination of Sequential Programs
How to extend this program logic so that it verifies the absence of infinite re-
cursion? We wish to impose an additional proof obligation at method call sites,
such that during any program execution only a finite number of method calls
occur. Since we are already using separation logic, which can be interpreted as
a logic of permissions, we introduce the notion of call permissions. If we make
available to a program’s main method only a finite stock of call permissions, and
a call permission is consumed at each call site, then it follows that an execution
can perform only finitely many calls.
Note that we should not count call permissions merely using a natural num-
ber. This would mean each method’s specification would state an upper bound
on the number of calls it performs. That would seem to require much tedious
and brittle bookkeeping, and cause problems if the number of calls depends on
nondeterministic phenomena such as user input.
The well-known solution to the counting issue in termination proofs is the
use of well-founded relations. A well-founded relation is one that admits no infi-
nite descending chains, or, equivalently, where each nonempty set has a minimal
element. In this paper, we will more specifically use ordinals, well-founded rela-
tions that are additionally strict total orders, and for which useful conventional
notations exist.34
We briefly review the ordinal theory used in this paper. The finite ordinals
are the natural numbers, with their usual order. The set of finite ordinals is
denoted ω. The product α · β of two sets of ordinals is the set of pairs (a, b) ∈
α × β, with their lexicographical ordering (with the least significant element
first): (a, b) < (a′, b′) iff b < b′ or b = b and a < a′. The exponentiation αβ
of two sets of ordinals is the set of functions f : β → α where only finitely
many arguments map to nonzero values; the order is a generalization of the
lexicographic order: f < f ′ iff f 6= f ′ and f(b) < f ′(b) where b is the maximum
3 Our implementation of the proposed proof system (see Sec. 6) supports arbitrary
well-founded relations.
4 Technically, the ordinals are the equivalence classes of well-ordered sets under iso-
morphism. A well-ordered set is a set with a well-ordering, i.e. a well-founded strict
total order. In an abuse of terminology, we will identify each such equivalence class
with each of its members.
argument such that f(b) 6= f ′(b). In particular, ωX yields the multisets (or
bags) of elements of X, with multiset order. We denote bags using fat braces:
{[a, b, c]} = 0 unionmulti {[a]} unionmulti {[b]} unionmulti {[c]}, where 0 denotes the empty multiset: 0 = λx. 0,
and M unionmultiM ′ denotes multiset union: M unionmultiM ′ = (λx. M(x) + M ′(x)). In order
to descend down the multiset order starting from a multiset M , one can replace
any element of M with any number of lesser elements of X, any number of times.
For example, {[0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2]} < {[0, 0, 0, 3]}.
Our program logic is based on the notion that at each point during a pro-
gram’s execution, it has a stock of call permissions in the form of a bag of ordinals
Λ ∈ ωOrdinals (for some fixed set of ordinals Ordinals). We admit ghost execu-
tion steps that reduce the stock of call permissions to a lesser one. Furthermore,
at each call, an element is removed from the bag. It follows that the program
terminates: an infinite execution would constitute an infinite descending chain
in ωOrdinals .
We extend our separation logic with an assertion for call permissions:
P ::= o.f 7→ v | P ∗ P | call perm(α) | · · ·
We interpret assertions under a predicate interpretation, a heap and a stock of
call permissions:
I, h, Λ  call perm(α) ⇔ α ∈ Λ
I, h, Λ  P ∗ P ′ ⇔ ∃h1, Λ1, h2, Λ2. h = h1 unionmulti h2 ∧ Λ = Λ1 unionmulti Λ2
∧ I, h1, Λ1  P ∧ I, h2, Λ2  P ′
The meaning of Hoare triples is now defined as follows:
 {P} c {Q} ⇔ ∀h,Λ, γ. Ifix, h, Λ  P ∧ (h, c) ⇓ γ ⇒ γ Λ Q
where satisfaction γ Λ Q of a postcondition by an outcome under a given stock
of call permissions is now defined as follows:
Λ′ ≤ Λ Ifix, h, Λ′  Q[v/res]
(n, v, h) Λ Q
Notice that divergence is no longer considered to satisfy a postcondition.
The only proof rules that change are the rule of consequence and the rules
for method calls. For the rule of consequence of our logic, we use a notion of
implication that allows weakening of the stock of call permissions:
P v P ′ ⇔ ∀h,Λ. h, Λ  P ⇒ ∃Λ′ < Λ. h, Λ′  P ′
We then have call perm(1) v call perm(0) ∗ call perm(0), and, more generally,
call perm(1) v ni=1 call perm(0), for any n, where bi=a P (i) represents iterated
separating conjunction:
bi=a P (i) =
{
true if b < a
P (a) ∗ bi=a+1 otherwise
In case i does not appear in P , we abbreviate ni=1 P to n · P . So, for any
α′ < α and any n, we have call perm(α) v n · call perm(α′).
The proof rules for method calls are as follows:
class C · · · { · · · static τ m(τ x) req P ; ens Q; · · · }
y = FV(P ) \ x z = FV(Q) \ x, result, y
` {call perm( ) ∗ P [v/x,w/y]} C.m(v) {∃w′. Q[v/x,w/y, w′/z, res/result]}
interface ι { · · · τ m(τ x); req P ; ens Q; · · · }
y = FV(P ) \ this, x z = FV(Q) \ this, x, result, y θ = o/this, v/x, w/y
` {call perm( ) ∗ P [θ]} o.m(v) {∃w′. Q[θ, w′/z, res/result]}
Soundness follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 2.
∀Λ, c, P,Q. ` {P} c {Q} ⇒
∀h, h0, hF , γ. h = h0 unionmulti hF ∧ Ifix, h0, Λ  P ∧ (h, c) ⇓ γ ⇒
∃n, h′, h′0, v, Λ′. γ = (n, v, h′) ∧ h′ = h′0 unionmulti hF ∧ Ifix, h′0, Λ′  Q[v/res])
Proof. By well-founded induction on (|c|, Λ), where |c| is the syntactic size of
command c. Fix some (N0, Λ0) and assume the lemma holds for all (|c|, Λ) <
(N0, Λ0). We prove that it holds for (|c|, Λ) = (N0, Λ0). By nested induction on
the derivation of ` {P} c {Q}. uunionsq
Now that we have call permissions, how do we use them to write modular
specifications? Clearly, each method should require some call permissions from
its caller in order to be able to perform calls itself. But how much? Which
ordinal?
It should not be necessary for a method to ask specifically for call permissions
for each call it performs. In particular, we assume a model where a program con-
sists of layers where each layer is built on top of lower layers to offer functionality
to higher layers. In this model, a method’s contract should not reveal whether, or
how often, the method calls into lower layers. This is clearly an implementation
detail that should not concern the method’s clients. To support this notion, we
assume that class definitions that appear earlier in a program text constitute
lower layers with respect to class definitions that appear later. Similarly, within
a class definition, we assume that methods that appear earlier constitute lower
layers with respect to methods that appear later. To enable abstraction over
calls to lower-layer methods, we will use class methods as ordinals, ordered by
their position in the program text.
Using this approach, if all calls in a program call static methods in lower
layers, it is sufficient for each method C.m to require call perm(C.m). Indeed, a
valid proof outline is shown in Figure 6.
Methods main and sqrt, before performing their nested call, replace the in-
coming call permission qualified by their own name with two copies of a call
permission qualified by their callee’s name. One copy is consumed at the start
of the call, the other is passed into the callee as required by its precondition.
class Math {
static int sqrtHelper(int x)
req 0 ≤ x ∧ call perm(Math.sqrtHelper);
ens true
{ · · · }
static int sqrt(int x)
req 0 ≤ x ∧ call perm(Math.sqrt);
ens true;
{
{2 · call perm(Math.sqrtHelper)}
Math.sqrtHelper(x)
}
}
class Program {
static void main()
req call perm(Program.main);
ens true;
{
{2 · call perm(Math.sqrt)}
Math.sqrt(42)
}
}
Fig. 6. A program with calls to lower-layer static methods only
Of course, in most programs not all calls, even if they call static methods,
call lower-layer methods, especially since our programming language does not
have loops. How to deal with recursive methods? First of all, we assume that
lower layers are developed before higher layers, and therefore lower layers never
call static methods in higher layers. It follows that each cycle in a program’s
graph of calls to static methods is contained entirely within a single module. In
our approach, then, all such members of a recursive cycle should be private to
the module, and therefore their contracts need not be abstract. Separate public
methods should be provided that call into the cycle but are not part of it.
An example is shown in Figure 7.
Notice that each of the members of the cycle requires call permission for the
maximum member. The contracts of isOddIter and isEvenIter are not abstract,
but those of isOdd and isEven are.
Notice that the coefficient of the call permission in the contracts of the re-
cursive methods serves the role of the classical recursion measure. However,
sometimes a recursion measure cannot easily be expressed as a simple natural
number.
To support such recursion measures, we move, for the set of ordinals that we
use to qualify call permissions, from methods to pairs of local ordinals and meth-
ods (where the method is the most significant component), given some fixed set
LocOrd of local ordinals. Public methods C.m should request call perm((0, C.m)).
class Math {
static bool isOddIter(int x)
req 0 ≤ x ∧
x · call perm(Math.isEvenIter);
ens result = (x mod 2 = 1);
{
if x = 0 then false else
Math.isEvenIter(x− 1)
}
static bool isEvenIter(int x)
req 0 ≤ x ∧
x · call perm(Math.isEvenIter);
ens result = (x mod 2 = 0);
{
if x = 0 then true else
Math.isOddIter(x− 1)
}
static bool isOdd(int x)
req 0 ≤ x ∧ call perm(Math.isOdd);
ens result = (x mod 2 = 0);
{ Math.isOddIter(x) }
static bool isEven(int x)
req 0 ≤ x ∧ call perm(Math.isEven);
ens result = (x mod 2 = 0);
{ Math.isEvenIter(x) }
}
Fig. 7. Recursion measured by a natural number
A classic example where an infinite ordinal is needed, is the Ackermann function:
class Math {
static int ackermannIter(int m, int n)
req 0 ≤ m ∧ 0 ≤ n ∧ call perm(((m, n),Math.ackermannIter));
ens result = Ack(m, n);
{
if n = 0 then m + 1
else if m = 0 then Math.ackermannIter(1, n− 1)
else {
int r := Math.ackermannIter(m− 1, n);
Math.ackermannIter(r, n− 1)
}
}
static int ackermann(int m, int n)
req 0 ≤ m ∧ 0 ≤ n ∧ call perm((0,Math.ackermann));
ens result = Ack(m, n);
{ Math.ackermannIter(m, n) }
}
We are now ready to consider the case of programs that call interface meth-
ods. Consider a method integrate for computing the integral of a real function
over an interval:
interface RealFunc {
double apply(double x);
}
class Math {
static double integrate(double a,double b,RealFunc f)
{ · · · }
}
What call permissions should method integrate request of its caller? Clearly, the
method should be allowed to call method apply of object f. And it should be
allowed to call it not just once, but arbitrarily often. Since the calls of f.apply
might occur inside recursive helper functions measured by arbitrary ordinals,
there is no single ordinal that can obviously serve as an upper bound. Further-
more, method integrate should be allowed to pass f to helper methods in lower
layers, and those should themselves be specified abstractly without revealing
how often they call f.
To solve this problem, we move, for the set of ordinals that we use to qual-
ify call permissions, from pairs of local ordinals and methods to pairs of local
ordinals and bags of methods:
ClassMethods = {C.m | class C · · · { · · · τ m(· · ·) · · · }
MethodBags = ωClassMethods
Ordinals = LocOrd ·MethodBags
Note that set ClassMethods includes both the static methods and the instance
methods.
Public methods C.m in programs that do not call interface methods should
request call perm((0, {[C.m]})).
The following contract for method integrate allows it to call f.apply arbitrarily
often, and to delegate a similar permission to lower-layer static methods:
static double integrate(double a,double b,RealFunc f)
req call perm((0, {[Math.integrate, f.apply]}));
Note that we use o.m as a shorthand for classOf(o).m.
However, we are not done. Indeed, when calling f.apply, we need not just the
call permission that is consumed by the call itself, but also the call permissions
requested by f.apply’s precondition. What should those be?
f.apply should be allowed to call static methods at layers below itself, so
it should at least receive a call permission qualified by its own name. However,
there are other methods that it should be allowed to call as well. Indeed, through
the fields of its this object, i.e. through the fields of f, this method may be able
to reach directly or indirectly any number of objects and might need to perform
any number of calls on any number of methods thereof. The method should
request permission for those calls as well.
But how can it abstractly request permission to call these methods, hidden
inside its private data structures, with whose existence its clients should not
otherwise be concerned?
We solve this problem by allowing the bag of methods reachable from an
object to be named abstractly by exposing it as an argument of the predicate
family that describes the object.
Consider first the partial-correctness specification for interface RealFunc in
Figure 8(a). We extend it for total corectness as shown in Figure 8(b).
interface RealFunc {
predicate RealFunc();
double apply(double x);
req this.RealFunc();
ens this.RealFunc();
}
(a) Partial correctness
interface RealFunc {
predicate RealFunc(MethodBag d);
double apply(double x);
req this.RealFunc(d) ∗ call perm((0, d));
ens this.RealFunc(d);
}
(b) Total correctness
Fig. 8. Annotations for interface RealFunc
We adapt the contract of method integrate accordingly:
static double integrate(double a,double b,RealFunc f)
req f.RealFunc(d) ∗ call perm((0, {[Math.integrate]} unionmulti d));
A simple implementation of interface RealFunc is shown in Figure 9. Notice that
class LinearFunc(double a,double b) implements RealFunc {
predicate RealFunc(MethodBag d) =
this.a 7→ ∗ this.b 7→ ∧ d = {[this.apply]};
double apply(double x)
{ double a := this.a; double b := this.b; a · x + b }
static RealFunc createLinearFunc(double a,double b)
req call perm((0, {[LinearFunc.createLinearFunc]}));
ens result.RealFunc(d) ∧ d < {[LinearFunc.createLinearFunc]};
{ new LinearFunc(a, b) }
}
Fig. 9. A simple implementation of interface RealFunc
method createLinearFunc’s postcondition provides an upper bound on d. This
enables the caller (who is necessarily in a higher layer than createLinearFunc) to
produce the call permissions required to call result.apply. Notice also that this
upper bound does not constrain method createLinearFunc’s implementation, if we
assume that a method only allocates (through new) objects of classes defined
in its own layer or in lower layers.
A slightly more involved implementation is shown in Figure 10. Notice that
class Sum(RealFunc f1,RealFunc f2) implements RealFunc {
predicate RealFunc(MethodBag d) =
this.f1 7→ f1 ∗ f1.RealFunc(d1) ∗ this.f2 7→ f2 ∗ f2.RealFunc(d2)
∧ d = {[this.apply]} unionmulti d1 unionmulti d2;
double apply(double x) {
RealFunc f1 := this.f1; RealFunc f2 := this.f2;
double r1 := f1.apply(x);double r2 := f2.apply(x);
r1 + r2
}
static RealFunc createSum(RealFunc f1,RealFunc f2)
req f1.RealFunc(d1) ∗ f2.RealFunc(d2)
∗ call perm((0, {[Sum.createSum]} unionmulti d1 unionmulti d2));
ens result.RealFunc(d) ∧ d < {[Sum.createSum]} unionmulti d1 unionmulti d2;
{ new Sum(f1, f2) }
}
Fig. 10. An implementation of interface RealFunc
class Sum’s instance of predicate family RealFunc defines its d parameter (which
we call the dynamic depth since it gives a measure of the number of layers of
abstraction of which the object is composed) as the multiset union of its own
apply method and the referenced objects’ dynamic depths. Indeed, as a general
pattern, an object’s dynamic depth should typically be defined as the union of
its own methods and the dynamic depths of the objects stored in its fields. This
allows the object to call those objects’ methods, assuming their contracts follow
the standard pattern exemplified by the contract of RealFunc.apply.
Notice also how this definition enables the successful verification of method
apply.
Method createSum’s precondition follows the general pattern: request a call
permission qualified by a multiset that is the union of the method itself and the
dynamic depths of any objects being passed into the method. Its postcondition
follows a general pattern for methods that return a new object: the new object’s
dynamic depth is bounded by the same multiset used to qualify the call permis-
sion in the precondition. It follows that any caller of this method can also call
the new object’s methods.
An implementation of method integrate and an example client program are
shown in Figure 11. The proof outline for method main starts by reducing the
incoming call permission to twelve copies of a call permission that is greater than
class Math {
static double integrateIter(double a,double dx, int n,RealFunc f)
req 0 ≤ n ∧ f.RealFunc(d) ∗ call perm((n, {[Math.integrateIter]} unionmulti d));
ens f.RealFunc(d);
{
if n = 0 then 0 else {
double y := f.apply(a);
double ys := Math.integrateIter(a + dx, dx, n− 1, f);
y × dx + ys
}
}
static double integrate(double a,double b,RealFunc f)
{ Math.integrateIter(a, (b− a)/1000, 1000, f) }
}
class Program {
static main()
req call perm((0, {[Program.main]}));
ens true;
{
{12 · call perm((0, {[2 · LinearFunc, 2 · Sum,Math]}))}
RealFunc f1 := LinearFunc.createLinearFunc(2, 3);
RealFunc f2 := LinearFunc.createLinearFunc(5, 6);
RealFunc f3 := LinearFunc.createLinearFunc(5, 6);
RealFunc f4 := Sum.createSum(f1, f2);
RealFunc f5 := Sum.createSum(f3, f4);
Math.integrate(0, 100, f5)
}
}
Fig. 11. An implementation of method integrate and a client program
each of the call permissions required for the six calls and the six preconditions.
(We use a class name as an abbreviation for its greatest method.) Indeed, we
have the inequalities shown in Figure 12.
An example of an interface method that takes as an argument another object
is shown in Figure 13.
Our approach supports programs written in continuation-passing style (CPS).
To illustrate this, we add CPS versions of methods contains and intersects to the
IntSet example. See Figures 14, 15, and 16. The predicate definitions and con-
structor methods remain unchanged and are not repeated.
Notice that the continuation interfaces do not follow the general specification
pattern. Indeed, since the invoke methods are invoked only once, any call permis-
sions they need can be passed via the ContainsCont or IntersectsCont predicate,
respectively.
Notice that InvokeCont1.invoke and InvokeCont2.invoke each require a single
call permission in order to perform the nested invoke call. It is passed via the
d1, d2, d3 < {[LinearFunc.createLinearFunc]}
d4 < {[Sum.createSum]} unionmulti d1 unionmulti d2
< {[Sum.createSum, LinearFunc.createLinearFunc]}
d5 < {[Sum.createSum]} unionmulti d3 unionmulti d4
< {[2 · LinearFunc.createLinearFunc, 2 · Sum.createSum]}
Fig. 12. Inequalities relevant for the proof of the integrate client program
predicate. The ordinal is irrelevant and is existentially quantified. In contrast,
InvokeCont3.invoke needs to call set.intersectsCPS and for that needs a properly
qualified call permission. The call permission that the InvokeCont3 object needs
to pass to the InvokeCont2 object can be derived from it.
4 Termination of Multithreaded Programs
In this section, we extend our approach to multithreaded programs. That is, we
extend our programming language with forking and joining of threads, and with
locks and channels (with unbounded buffering) for inter-thread communication.
We do not consider condition variables.
In this setting, termination consists of two aspects: absence of infinite exe-
cutions, and absence of deadlocks.
Our approach, as presented in the preceding section, already prevents infi-
nite executions, provided that, if thread creation involves method calls, a call
permission is consumed for each such method call, just like for other method
calls. When a thread creates a new thread, the creating thread’s stock of call
permissions is split among the two threads. Furthermore, threads can exchange
call permissions through synchronization constructs, just like they can exchange
regular memory access permissions. Absence of infinite executions follows from
the fact that the total stock of call permissions in the system, i.e. the multiset
union of all threads’ stocks of call permission (plus any call permissions owned by
synchronization constructs while being transferred between threads) decreases
at each method call.
We define a deadlock as an execution where a thread is eventually disabled
forever, by being blocked in a synchronization construct and never getting un-
blocked. To verify absence of deadlocks, we adopt the approach of Leino et al.
[6] for modular specification and verification of deadlock-freedom of programs
involving channels, locks, and joining of threads. They present their approach in
the context of their Chalice verification system, but since Chalice is, like sepa-
ration logic, centered around the concept of permissions, porting the approach
to separation logic is fairly straightforward.
In this approach, performing a receive operation on a channel consumes a
credit for this channel, which can be thought of as a receive permission. At any
point in time, the total number of credits for a channel in the system equals the
number of messages in the channel’s buffer plus the number of debits for that
channel. A thread holding a debit for a channel has an obligation to send on
interface IntSet {
predicate IntSet(MethodBag d);
bool contains(int x);
req this.IntSet(d) ∗ call perm((0, d));
ens this.IntSet(d);
bool intersects(IntSet other);
req this.IntSet(d) ∗ other.IntSet(do) ∗ call perm((0, d unionmulti do));
ens this.IntSet(d) ∗ other.IntSet(do);
}
class Empty() implements IntSet {
predicate IntSet(MethodBag d) = d = {[this.∗]};
bool contains(int x) { false }
bool intersects(IntSet other) { false }
IntSet createEmpty()
req call perm((0, {[Empty.createEmpty]}));
ens result.IntSet(d) ∧ d < {[Empty.createEmpty]};
{ new Empty() }
}
class Insert(int elem, IntSet set) implements IntSet {
predicate IntSet(MethodBag d) =
this.elem 7→ elem ∗ this.set 7→ set ∗ set.IntSet(ds) ∧ d = {[this.∗]} unionmulti ds;
bool contains(int x) {
int elem := this.elem;
if x = elem then true else {
IntSet set := this.set;
set.contains(x)
}
}
bool intersects(IntSet other) {
int elem := this.elem;
bool contains := other.contains(elem);
if contains then true else {
IntSet set := this.set;
set.intersects(other)
}
}
IntSet createInsert(int elem, IntSet set)
req set.IntSet(ds) ∗ call perm((0, {[Insert.createInsert]} unionmulti ds));
ens result.IntSet(d) ∧ d < {[Insert.createInsert]} unionmulti ds;
{ new Insert(elem, set) }
}
Fig. 13. An interface method that takes as an argument another object
interface ContainsCont {
predicate ContainsCont(IntSet set,MethodBag d);
void invoke(bool result);
req this.ContainsCont(set, d) ∗ set.IntSet(d);
}
interface IntersectsCont {
predicate IntersectsCont(IntSet set,MethodBag d, IntSet other,MethodBag do);
void invoke(bool result);
req this.IntersectsCont(set, d, other, do) ∗ set.IntSet(d) ∗ other.IntSet(do);
}
interface IntSet {
bool containsCPS(int x,ContainsCont cont);
req this.IntSet(d) ∗ call perm((0, d)) ∗ cont.ContainsCont(this, d);
bool intersectsCPS(IntSet other, IntersectsCont cont);
req this.IntSet(d) ∗ other.IntSet(do) ∗ call perm((0, d unionmulti do))
∗ cont.ContainsCont(this, d, other, do);
}
Fig. 14. Continuation-passing-style versions of contains and intersects. All postcondi-
tions are false and are not shown.
that channel. When a receive operation blocks, the receiving thread is effectively
waiting for the thread holding the debit to perform the promised send operation.
A thread may at any time create a debit. This ghost operation also creates a
credit. A credit is also created by sending. A credit can be used to receive or to
cancel out a debit.
A deadlock can occur only if eventually there is a cycle of threads, each of
which is waiting on the next to terminate, to send on a channel, or to release a
lock. This is prevented by assigning to each thread, channel, and lock (i.e. each
potential target of a wait operation) a wait level, and by allowing a thread to
perform a wait operation only if the wait level of the target is less than the
wait levels of the thread’s obligations (i.e. its own wait level as a target for join
operations, the wait levels of the channels for which it holds debits, and the wait
levels of the locks which it holds), assuming that the less-than relation on wait
levels is a strict partial order.5
An issue not addressed by Leino et al. [6] is the matter of information hiding
in method contracts: how to write contracts that do not unnecessarily reveal
information about, or constrain, implementations? In particular, their approach
requires that each method that directly or indirectly performs a wait operation
on a pre-existing synchronization object specify in its precondition a constraint
on the thread’s obligation set, the set of the wait levels of its obligations. In
5 Leino et al. [6] require the wait level to be greater.
class Empty() implements IntSet {
bool containsCPS(int x,ContainsCont cont)
{ cont.invoke(false) }
bool intersectsCPS(IntSet other, IntersectsCont cont);
{ cont.invoke(false) }
}
class InsertCont1(ContainsCont cont) implements ContainsCont {
predicate ContainsCont(IntSet set,MethodBag d) =
this.cont 7→ cont ∗ cont.ContainsCont(set0, d0)
∗ set0.elem 7→ ∗ set0.set 7→ set
∗ call perm( ) ∧ d = {[set0.∗]} unionmulti d0;
void invoke(bool result)
{ ContainsCont cont := this.cont; cont.invoke(result) }
}
class InsertCont2(IntersectsCont cont) implements IntersectsCont {
predicate IntersectsCont(
IntSet set,MethodBag d, IntSet other,MethodBag do) =
this.cont 7→ cont ∗ cont.IntersectsCont(set0, d0, other, do)
∗ set0.elem 7→ ∗ set0.set 7→ set
∗ call perm( ) ∧ d = {[set0.∗]} unionmulti d0;
void invoke(bool result)
{ IntersectsCont cont := this.cont; cont.invoke(result) }
}
class InsertCont3(Insert set0, IntSet other, IntersectsCont cont)
implements ContainsCont {
predicate ContainsCont(IntSet set,MethodBag d) =
this.set0 7→ set0 ∗ this.other 7→ set ∗ this.cont 7→ cont
∗ (set0.IntSet(ds0) ∧ ds0 = {[set0.∗]} unionmulti ds1)
∗ call perm((0, {[InsertCont3.invoke]} unionmulti ds1 unionmulti d))
∗ cont.IntersectsCont(set0, ds0, set, d);
void invoke(bool result) {
Insert set0 := this.set0; IntSet other := this.other;
IntersectsCont cont := this.cont;
if result then cont.invoke(true) else {
IntSet set := set0.set;
IntersectsCont cont1 := new InsertCont2(cont);
set.intersectsCPS(other, cont1)
}
}
}
Fig. 15. Implementations of containsCPS and intersectsCPS in classes Empty and Insert
(Part 1 of 2)
class Insert(int elem, IntSet set) implements IntSet {
bool containsCPS(int x,ContainsCont cont) {
int elem := this.elem;
if x = elem then cont.invoke(true) else {
IntSet set := this.set;
ContainsCont cont1 := new InsertCont1(cont);
set.containsCPS(x, cont1)
}
}
bool intersectsCPS(IntSet other, IntersectsCont cont);
int elem := this.elem;
ContainsCont cont1 := new InsertCont3(this, other, cont);
other.containsCPS(elem, cont1);
}
}
Fig. 16. Implementations of containsCPS and intersectsCPS in classes Empty and Insert
(Part 2 of 2)
particular, any such method must require of its caller that the obligation set’s
elements be above the wait level of the object it will wait on.
If the wait operation is part of the method’s advertised behavior, and the
caller is aware of the synchronization object’s existence, then this is not a prob-
lem. But how to deal with private synchronization objects protecting a module’s
internal state, with which callers should not be concerned?
To address this problem, we propose to use the same bags of methods we
use to qualify call permissions for verifying absence of infinite recursion, also to
qualify wait levels. Specifically, we propose to use as the set of wait levels the set
LocalLevels ·MethodBags, for some set LocalLevels of local levels used to order
the various synchronization objects used within a particular module. We assume
LocalLevels has a top element >. A lock that protects a module C’s static state
(i.e. state not associated with a particular object) should have as its wait level
the pair (`, {[C]}) for some ` (where, again we use a class name to abbreviate the
class’ greatest method). A lock that protects an object with dynamic depth d
should have wait level (`, d).
Each module’s public methods, regardless of whether their current imple-
mentations actually perform wait operations, should require that the current
thread’s obligations be greater than the receiver’s dynamic depth. This speci-
fication style allows every module to acquire private locks, and furthermore it
enables each module to satisfy its callees’ analogous requirements.
4.1 Compare-and-swap loops
We now further extend our programming language with atomic machine instruc-
tions such as atomic loads, stores, and compare-and-swap operations. The latter,
of the form x := a.compareAndSwap(o, n), where a is an object encapsulating an
atomic variable, atomically checks if a’s value equals old value o, and, if so, sets it
to new value n. The operation returns the value read. We assume the operations
have sequentially consistent semantics.
Atomic machine instructions are used to write lock-free concurrent data struc-
tures, such as queues or stacks used to distribute work in parallel computing. A
data structure is lock-free if, at any point, there exists a number N such that
if any of the threads currently accessing the data structure is scheduled for N
steps, then at least one of the threads accessing the data structure will complete
the operation. Note that this is not the case for data structures that use locks,
since if the thread holding the lock is not scheduled, no other thread can make
progress.
Consider the example of a lock-free stack in Figure 17.
class Node(int value,Node next) {}
class Stack(Node head) {
void pushIter(int value) {
Node head := 〈this.head〉;Node n := new Node(value, head);
Node head1 :=
〈 Node head1 := this.head; if head1 = head then this.head := n; head1 〉;
if head1 6= head then this.pushIter(value)
}
void push(int value) { this.pushIter(value) }
}
Fig. 17. A lock-free stack. (The pop operation is similar and is not shown.)
We only show the push operation; the pop operation is similar. We use the
atomic block notation 〈c〉 to denote the command c executed atomically. The
code exhibits a typical compare-and-swap loop: it reads a shared variable, com-
putes a new value, and then attempts to install the new value, under the con-
dition that the variable was not changed by another thread in the meantime.
Otherwise, it tries again.
Our approach for verifying absence of infinite executions can be used to verify
termination of programs involving compare-and-swap loops like the one above.
A proof outline for the example program is shown in Figure 18.
The proof is based on the observation that whenever an operation has to try
again, then some other concurrent operation has succeeded. The idea is then that
the operation that succeeds supplies a call permission to each of the concurrent
operations that it causes to fail, to enable them to try again. Since it is not
known beforehand how many concurrent operations will be in progress at that
time, method push passes a call permission qualified with ω (the first infinite
ordinal) to pushIter. Note: a pushIter execution does not use this call permission
for its own recursive calls; rather, it uses it only when it succeeds, to supply the
class GhostBag[T] {
predicate GhostBag(Bag[T] elems);
void add(T value);
req this.GhostBag(elems);
ens this.GhostBag(elems unionmulti {[value]}) ∗ this.GhostBagHandle(value);
void remove(T value);
req this.GhostBag(elems) ∗ this.GhostBagHandle(value);
ens this.GhostBag(elems− {[value]}) ∧ value ∈ elems;
}
class Stack(Node head ,GhostBag[Node] readers ) {
static predicate nodes(Node n) =
n = null ∨ n.value 7→ ∗ n.next 7→ next ∗ nodes(next);
predicate SpaceInv() =
this.head 7→ h ∗ nodes(h) ∗ this.readers 7→ readers ∗ readers.GhostBag(rs)
∗ call perm((|{[r ∈ rs | r 6= h]}|, {[Stack.pushIter]}));
predicate Stack(d) = atomic space(this.SpaceInv) ∗ this.readers 7→
∧ d = {[Stack.push]};
void pushIter(int value)
req [pi]this.Stack(d) ∗ call perm((ω, {[Stack.pushIter]}));
ens [pi]this.Stack(d);
{
GhostBag[Node] readers := this.readers;
Node head := 〈
Node head := this.head; readers.add(head); head
〉;{
[pi]atomic space(this.SpaceInv) ∗
this.readers 7→ readers ∗ readers.GhostBagHandle(head)
}
Node n := new Node(value, head);
Node head1 := 〈
readers.remove(head);
Node head1 := this.head;
if head1 = head then this.head := n;
head1
〉;
if head1 6= head then this.pushIter(value)
}
void push(int value)
req [pi]this.Stack(d) ∗ call perm((0, d));
ens [pi]this.Stack(d);
{ this.pushIter(value) }
}
Fig. 18. Proof outline for the lock-free stack example
required call permissions to the concurrent operations. At that point, it reduces
ω to the number of concurrent operations in progress at that time.
The proof uses fractional permissions [7, 8] to enable sharing. Fractional
points-to permissions, that enable read-only sharing of memory locations, are
denoted `
pi7→ v where pi denotes a positive real number, or ` 7→ v if the precise
fraction is irrelevant. A fraction can be applied to a predicate using the syntax
[pi]p(); the meaning of this is simply the predicate body, with the fraction applied
to each separating conjunct of it. The notation p() abbreviates [1]p().
To verify the atomic blocks, the proof uses the notion of an atomic space:
similar to a lock, an atomic space has an atomic space invariant that describes
resources that are being shared between multiple threads and that should only be
accessed through atomic blocks. The ghost operation of creating an atomic space
consumes the resources described by the atomic space invariant, and produces
an atomic space handle atomic space(p), where p is the name of a predicate that
serves as the atomic space invariant. The proof rules are as follows:
p() v atomic space(p)
[pi1 + pi2]atomic space(p)⇔ [pi1]atomic space(p) ∗ [pi2]atomic space(p)
{p() ∗ P} c {p() ∗Q}
{[pi]atomic space(p) ∗ P} 〈c〉 {[pi]atomic space(p) ∗Q}
The proof tracks the set of operations in progress (i.e. the threads that
have performed the atomic read but have not yet performed the correspond-
ing compare-and-swap) through a ghost object readers, an instance of ghost class
GhostBag, whose specification is shown in Figure 18. The ghost bag is owned
by the same atomic space that owns the stack’s head field and the linked list of
nodes (described by the nodes predicate). The GhostBagHandle predicate that
a thread receives when it inserts an element into the ghost bag enables it to
“remember” that it has an element in the ghost bag in between the atomic op-
erations. The ghost bag in particular contains, for each operation in progress,
the value of the head field that it read. The atomic space additionally holds, for
each operation in progress whose head value is out of date, a call permission. As
a failed operation removes its element from the ghost bag, it can also extract a
call permission from the atomic space, enabling it to try again.
5 Liveness
Many programs, such as servers, are not supposed to terminate. Still, they should
be responsive: if there are pending requests, the server should eventually respond.
More generally, a program should always eventually interact with its environ-
ment; we call this liveness.
For example, consider the following program:
class OS {
static void beep();
}
class Program {
static void iter()
{ OS.beep();Program.iter() }
static void main()
{ Program.iter() }
}
This program does not terminate; however, it is live.
There is a simple way to encode a liveness property as a termination property.
Suppose we wish to verify that a program always eventually performs an I/O
operation. Then it is sufficient to prove that the program terminates, assuming
that the N ’th I/O operation causes the program to terminate, for some unknown
but fixed N . This can be encoded into a specification of our approach as shown
in Figure 19.
class OS {
static predicate IO(int n);
static void beep();
req IO(n);
ens 0 < n ∧ IO(n− 1);
}
class Program {
static void iter()
req IO(n) ∗ call perm((n, {[Program.iter]}));
ens false;
{ OS.beep();Program.iter() }
static void main()
req IO(n) ∗ call perm((0, {[Program.main]}));
ens false;
{ Program.iter() }
}
Fig. 19. Liveness verification example
6 Implementation
We integrated the logic into the program verification tool VeriFast. Although
VeriFast supports C and Java, for now we have added support for verification
of termination only for C programs. We introduced the function specification
clause terminates, to indicate that a function should terminate. In order to
reduce specification overhead for functions that do not perform callbacks, our
implementation offers a ghost command that allows a function to produce out of
thin air any call permission whose bag of functions is less than itself (considered
as a singleton bag). In exchange, our implementation consumes at a call site not
just any call permission, but only a call permission whose function bag includes
the function being called:
f ∈ d function f(x) req P ; ens Q; { c }
y = FV(P ) \ x z = FV(Q) \ x, result, y
f0 ` {call perm((α, d)) ∗ P [v/x,w/y]} f(v) {∃w′. Q[v/x,w/y, w′/z, res/result]}
∀v, w. f ` {P [v/x,w/y]} c {∃w′. Q[v/x,w/y, w′/z, res/result]}
y = FV(P ) \ x z = FV(Q) \ x, result, y
` function f(x) req P ; ens Q; { c } ok
d < {[f ]}
f ` {true} produce call perm {call perm((α, d))}
Our implementation is included in the latest VeriFast release, which is avail-
able at http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/˜bartj/verifast/.
The distribution includes, in the directory examples/termination, the exam-
ples ackermann.c, simple recursion.c (the isEven example), funcptr.c (correspond-
ing to the IntFunc example of this paper), and cons.c (corresponding to the IntSet
example). Furthermore, it includes, in the directory examples/termination/concur-
rent, specifications for semaphores (semas.h), channels (channels.h), and mutexes
(mutexes.h), based on the ideas of Leino et al. [6], and the examples prodcons.c (a
producer-consumer example using channels) and stack.c (the compare-and-swap
loop example).
Porting our implementation to Java programs is mostly straightforward. One
issue, however, is that in Java channel deadlocks cannot easily be ruled out
completely. This is because the Java language specification allows the VM to
throw a VirtualMachineError exception at any time [JLS, Java SE 8 Ed., §11.1].
Furthermore, if an exception reaches the top of a thread, the thread terminates
but the program does not. Therefore, if a thread that holds a debit (i.e. an
obligation to send) receives a VirtualMachineError and this exception kills the
thread, then any thread that waits on this debit will deadlock. The root problem
is that Java does not properly propagate failures. A language extension that
would address this issue was proposed by Jacobs and Piessens [9].
7 Related Work
The proof assistant Coq includes a pure functional programming language with
higher-order functions. Coq checks that all functions terminate. However, Coq’s
type system prevents a function from being passed as an argument to itself. Our
approach supports methods that call themselves through dynamic binding, and
can prove their termination.
Koka [10] is a functional programming language with effect inference, includ-
ing the divergence effect. However, the inference algorithm is limited: it rules
out recursion through the heap, which our approach supports.
Dafny [11] is a programming language that supports verification of termina-
tion, with powerful metrics. However, Dafny does not support dynamic binding
of method calls.
Rudich et al. [12] verify well-formedness of pure method specifications. These
may involve dynamically bound pure method calls.
8 Conclusion
We propose an approach for the modular specification and verification of to-
tal correctness properties of single-threaded and multithreaded object-oriented
programs involving dynamically bound method calls. As far as we know, it is
the first such approach. We propose a specification style that does not constrain
implementations unnecessarily. The style enables any module to acquire private
locks. The approach supports compare-and-swap loops. We sketch an encoding
of liveness properties.
We have implemented our approach in a verification tool and validated it on
a handful of small but challenging example programs. Further experimentation
is needed, however, to see if our approach conveniently handles all program
patterns.
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A Concurrency proof rules
In this appendix, we show our translation of the approach of Leino et al. [6] into
separation logic.
We extend our programming language with commands for forking and joining
threads, creating locks and channels, acquiring and releasing locks, and sending
and receiving on channels:
τ ::= · · · | thread | lock | channel[τ ]
c ::= · · · | fork c | e.join() | new lock() | new channel[τ ]()
| e.acquire() | e.release() | e.send(e) | e.receive()
We extend our assertion language with constructs for describing threads, locks,
and channels:
P,Q ::= · · · | t.thread[τ ](w,Q) | `.lock(w, pi, I) | `.locked(w, pi, I, t)
| χ.channel[τ ](w,P ) | χ.credit() | χ.debit() | t.obs(W )
where t, w, `, pi, χ and W range over (expressions denoting) thread identifiers,
wait levels, lock identifiers, fractions (rational numbers between zero, exclusive,
and one, inclusive), channel identifiers, and bags of wait levels, respectively.
t.thread[τ ](w,Q) asserts that thread t has result type τ , wait level w, and post-
condition Q, where Q is an assertion with a free variable result denoting the
thread result. `.lock(w, pi, I) asserts fractional ownership with fraction pi of lock
` created at wait level w with invariant I. `.locked(w, pi, I, t) additionally de-
notes that thread t currently holds the lock. χ.channel[τ ](w,P ) asserts shared
ownership of channel χ with element type τ created at wait level w with element
predicate P , which is an assertion with a free variable element denoting an ele-
ment. Whenever the channel holds elements v, it owns the resources described
by
⊙
v∈v P [v/element]. χ.credit() asserts ownership of one credit (receive per-
mission) for channel χ. χ.debit() asserts ownership of one debit (send obligation)
for channel χ. t.obs(W ) asserts that bag W collects the wait levels of thread t’s
obligations.
These assertions satisfy the following laws:
`.lock(w, pi1 + pi2, I)⇔ `.lock(w, pi1, I) ∗ `.lock(w, pi2, I)
`.lock(w, 1, I)⇒ I
χ.channel[τ ](w,P )⇒ χ.channel[τ ](w,P ) ∗ χ.channel[τ ](w,P )
t.obs(W ) ∗ χ.channel[τ ](w,P )⇔ t.obs(W unionmulti {[w]}) ∗ χ.channel[τ ](w,P )
∗ χ.debit() ∗ χ.credit()
In words: lock fractions can be split and merged; full lock ownership allows the
owner to destroy the lock, obtaining direct ownership of the protected resource;
channel fractions can be split; channel debits can be created and destroyed, which
implies creating/destroying an obligation. Notice that any thread can destroy a
debit, not just the one that created it.
The proof rules are shown in Figure 20.
W ′ ⊆W ` {tid.obs(W ′ unionmulti {[w]}) ∗ P} c {tid.obs({[w]}) ∗Q[res/result]}
` {tid.obs(W ) ∗ P} fork c {tid.obs(W −W ′) ∗ res.thread(w,Q)}
`
{tid.obs(W ) ∗ t.thread[τ ](w,Q) ∧ w ≺W}
t.join()
{tid.obs(W ) ∗Q[res/result]}
` {I} new lock() {res.lock(w, 1, I)}
`
{tid.obs(W ) ∗ `.lock(w, pi, I) ∧ w ≺W}
t.acquire()
{tid.obs(W unionmulti {[w]}) ∗ `.locked(w, pi, I, tid) ∗ I}
`
{tid.obs(W ) ∗ `.locked(w, pi, I, tid) ∗ I ∧ w ∈W}
t.release()
{tid.obs(W − {[w]}) ∗ `.lock(w, pi, I)}
` {true} new channel[τ ]() {res.channel[τ ](w,P )}
` {χ.channel[τ ](w,P ) ∗ P [v/element]} χ.send(v) {χ.credit()}
`
{tid.obs(W ) ∗ χ.channel[τ ](w,P ) ∗ χ.credit() ∧ w ≺W}
χ.receive()
{tid.obs(W ) ∗ P [res/element]}
Fig. 20. Separation logic proof rules for the approach of Leino et al. [6]. w ≺W means
∀w′ ∈W. w < w′.
When a parent thread forks a child thread, the parent can pass some of its
obligations to the child. The child is additionally charged with an obligation w,
representing the obligation to terminate. w is the wait level of the new thread; it
can be picked freely. The child must dispose of all of the obligations it received
from its parent before it terminates.
Joining implies waiting, so the wait level of the target thread must be below
the joining thread’s obligations.
Creating a lock consumes the lock invariant. A wait level w for the lock can
be picked freely.
When a thread acquires a lock, its thread identifier is recorded as an argument
of the locked assertion. This ensures that the same thread releases the lock, as
required by most lock implementations.
Releasing a lock requires that the lock’s wait level is among the current
thread’s obligations. This could be invalidated by destroying a debit.
Sending on a channel produces a credit, and receiving consumes it.
B Soundness for concurrent programs
Here, we sketch an approach for proving soundness of a verification approach for
total correctness properties of concurrent programs based on the ideas proposed
in this paper.
We start from the verification approach for partial correctness properties of
fine-grained concurrent programs of Jacobs and Piessens [13], and its soundness
proof. In this proof, program semantics is described as a small-step relation
 on machine configurations γ. The goal is to prove that the special failure
configuration abort is not reachable. The soundness proof defines a notion of
a valid configuration valid(γ) and proves that if the program’s correctness is
provable by the proof rules of the approach, then the initial configuration is
valid, abort is not valid, and validity is preserved by execution steps. It follows
that each reachable configuration is valid and that abort is not reachable.
To formally state total correctness, we define the notion of a configuration
γ producing a behavior O, denoted γ ⇓ O, where O is either a configuration γ′,
denoting a finite run ending in a configuration γ′, or ⊥, denoting an infinite run.
We define this judgment coinductively using the following inference rules:
γ 6 
γ ⇓ γ
====
γ  γ′ γ′ ⇓ O
γ ⇓ O
=================
We say a behavior O terminates if O is a configuration where all threads have
terminated. We say a program terminates if its initial configuration γ0 only
produces terminating behaviors:
program terminates⇔ ∀O. γ0 ⇓ O ⇒ O terminates
We prove this by introducing the notion of a valid configuration under a bag
of ordinals Λ, where Λ represents the total stock of call permissions available
at that point. If a program’s correctness is provable by the proof rules of our
approach, then there exists a Λ0 such that validΛ0(γ0). Furthermore, if γ  γ′
and validΛ(γ), then there exists a Λ
′ such that validΛ′(γ′) and (|γ′|, Λ′) < (|γ|, Λ),
where |γ| is the syntactic size of γ. Indeed, at each execution step either some
thread’s current command is reduced to one that is smaller, or some thread per-
forms a method call and a call permission is consumed. Soundness then follows
by the following lemma:
Lemma 3.
validΛ(γ) ∧ γ ⇓ O ⇒ O terminates
Proof. By well-founded induction on (|γ|, Λ). That O is not a deadlocked config-
uration follows from the soundness of the approach of Leino et al. [6]; see their
soundness proof.
C Soundness of the liveness approach
We adapt the approach of the preceding section to the liveness setting. First,
we introduce machine steps that perform I/O, denoted
io . We define γ  γ′ as
γ
io γ′∨γ  γ′. We then define a set of traces, coinductively using the following
grammar:
τ ::= io::τ | γ | ⊥
We define the traces of a configuration, coinductively as follows:
Trace-Normal
γ 6 
γ ⇓ γ
====
Trace-Silent
γ  γ′ γ′ ⇓ τ
γ ⇓ τ
================
Trace-IO
γ
io γ′ γ′ ⇓ τ
γ ⇓ io::τ
================
We define liveness of a trace, coinductively:
Live-Term
γ terminated
γ live
===========
Live-IO
τ live
io::τ live
=======
Here, γ terminated asserts that in γ all threads have terminated normally, i.e.,
no deadlock and no failure. The non-live traces are the ones that end in a failure
or deadlocked configuration, or that eventually perform non-I/O steps forever.
We introduce a notion of validity of a configuration under a bag of ordinals
Λ and an I/O count N , denoted validΛ,N (γ), such that
1. if a program is provably correct, then for all N0, there exists a Λ0 such that
validΛ0,N0(γ0) holds, where γ0 is the program’s initial configuration;
2. if γ  γ′ and validΛ,N (γ) then ∃Λ′. validΛ′,N (γ′) and (|γ′|, Λ′) < (|γ|, Λ);
and
3. if γ
io γ′ and validΛ,N (γ) and 0 < N , then ∃Λ′. validΛ′,N−1(γ′) and (|γ′|, Λ′) <
(|γ|, Λ).
4. if validΛ,N (γ) then γ is not deadlocked and not failed.
We have the following corollary:
Lemma 4. If γ  γ′ and ∀N. ∃Λ. validΛ,N (γ), then ∀N ′. ∃Λ′. validΛ′,N ′(γ′).
Proof. Fix a γ, γ′, and N ′. If γ  γ′, take N = N ′; the goal follows easily. If
γ
io γ′, take N = N ′ + 1; the goal follows easily.
Soundness then follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 5.
∀τ, Λ, γ. (∀N. ∃Λ′. validΛ′,N (γ)) ∧ validΛ,0(γ) ∧ γ ⇓ τ ⇒ τ live
Proof. By coinduction. Fix τ . By well-founded induction on (|γ|, Λ). By case
analysis on γ ⇓ τ .
– Case Trace-Normal. By Live-Term.
– Case Trace-Silent. By the inner induction hypothesis.
– Case Trace-IO. By Live-IO and the outer induction hypothesis. (Take
N = 0.)
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